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THE CALIFORNIA MARIJUANA POSSESSION STATUTE:
AN INFRINGEMENT ON THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY OR
OTHER PERIPHERAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS?
The question of the constitutional validity of the California
marijuana possession statute in light of recent decisions will be ex-
amined in this comment. Before undertaking the constitutional anal-
ysis, a review of the statute itself is in order.
Under California law, a person who "plants, cultivates, harvests,
dries,.., processes ... or possesses" marijuana' is committing a
felony,2 and, if convicted, faces a mandatory sentence of 1 to 10
years in the state prison for a first offense, 2 to 20 years for a second
offense, and 5 years to life imprisonment for a third offense.3 In
contrast to the harsh penalties for offenses involving the possession of
marijuana, using marijuana or being under its influence are mis-
demeanors, punishable by county jail sentences ranging from 90 days
to 1 year.4 The severity of punishment for possession of marijuana
may also be contrasted with the misdemeanor penalty assessed for
possession of LSD (lysergic acid diethylamide).r
If the narcotic possessed is one of the "hard" narcotics such as
heroin, morphine, or cocaine, which are addictive whereas marijuana
is not,6 the punishment is quite similar to the penalties for mari-
juana possession. The statute assesses penalties of 2 to 10 years for a
first conviction, 5 to 20 years for a second conviction and 15 years
to life imprisonment for a third conviction.7
As a further contrast, it is noted that there is no law against the
mere possession of alcoholic beverages in spite of the well-known
1 The statutory definition of marijuana is: "all parts of the plant Canna-
bis sativa L. (commonly known as marijuana), whether growing or not; the
seeds thereof; the resin extracted from any part of such plant; and every
compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of such plant,
its seed or resin." CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11003.1.
2 Under CAL. PEN. CODE § 17 a felony is defined as "a crime which is
punishable with death or by imprisonment in the state prison."
3 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11530.
4 CAL. HEATH & SAFETY CODE § 11721. In practice the part of the stat-
ute prohibiting use of marijuana has little importance because if the accused
possesses marijuana he will be prosecuted under the felony provisions of
section 11530; if he does not possess marijuana but is under its influence then
section 11721 will be applied. Boyko & Rotberg, Constitutional Objections to
California's Marijuana Possession Statute, 14 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 773, 785 n.63
(1967).
5 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11910 treats a first conviction for the
possession of LSD (classified as a restricted dangerous drug in CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE § 11901(c)) as a misdemeanor subject to a maximum punish-
ment of a $1000 fine and 1 year imprisonment in the county jail.
6 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 3009 states: "A 'narcotic addict,' as used
in this subdivision refers to any person, adult or minor, who is addicted to
the unlawful use of any narcotic as defined in Division 10 of the Health and
Safety Code, except marijuana." (emphasis added).
7 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11500.
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dangers of this intoxicant.8 Criminal penalties are imposed only
when alcohol is used in some abusive manner, such as when a person
is intoxicated in public9 or operates a motor vehicle while under
the influence of alcohol.10
The legislative history of marijuana regulation shows a trend of
increasingly severe penalties for its possession. In 1907 marijuana was
first regulated by the California Legislature when it was included
within the class of substances which had to be labeled as "poison.""
Possession of marijuana was lawful until 1915 when possession unless
prescribed by a physician was prohibited.12 In 1929 the legislature
passed the State Narcotic Act 13 which regulated the possession of
marijuana by including it among habit forming, narcotic and other
dangerous drugs and substances. Thus marijuana was at this time
first included among the "hard" narcotics such as heroin, morphine,
and cocaine.14
In 1939 the Narcotics Act was incorporated into the California
Health and Safety Code15 along with the same illicit narcotics gath-
ered together in 1929.16 Marijuana possession and the planting pro-
visions were placed in section 11530, a separate section, in 1959.1 The
present mandatory felony sentences were part of a scheme by which
longer sentences for possession of all narcotics were imposed in 1961.18
Prior to 1961 the punishment for marijuana possession was in the
alternative so that the trial judge in his discretion could make the
offense either a misdemeanor or a felony depending on the sentence
imposed.' 9
It is clear that the most recent development in a long history of
8 Even where possession by certain groups likely to misuse alcohol is
discouraged, the method of control is to restrict the sale of alcoholic beverages
to them. For example, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25658 (a) makes sale of al-
coholic beverages to a minor a misdemeanor, and CAL. PE. CODE § 397 makes
the sale of alcoholic beverages to any habitual drunk a misdemeanor. See
In re Luera, 28 Cal. App. 185, 152 P. 738 (1915), holding a municipal ordinance
making the possession of alcohol illegal to be an unconstitutional abridgment
of the privileges and immunities guaranteed a citizen by U.S. CoNsT. art. IV,
§ 2, and amend. XIV, § 1. But see In re Yun Quong, 159 Cal. 508, 114 P. 835
(1911), where the privileges and inmmunities argument failed when used to
attack a conviction for possession of opium. For an interesting view why
different societal attitudes concerning marijuana and alcohol prevail, see note
178 infra.
9 CAL. PMT. CODE § 647(f) punishes as a misdemeanant one "[w]ho is
found in any public place under the influence of intoxicating liquor . 2.
10 CAL. VzMCLE CODE §§ 23101-02.
11 Cal. Stats. 1907, ch. 102, §§ 1-10, at 124-26 (Indian hemp, another
name for marijuana, is used in the statute).
12 Cal. Stats. 1915, ch. 604, § 2, at 1067-71 (Loco weed, another name for
marijuana, is used in the statute).
18 Cal. Stats. 1929, ch. 216, 9 1, at 380-83.
14 Id.
't Cal. Stats. 1939, ch. 60, §9 11000-797, at 755-76.
16 Cal. Stats. 1939, ch. 60, § 11712, at 771.
17 Cal. Stats. 1959, ch. 1112, § 7, at 3194-95.
18 Cal. Stats. 1961, ch. 274, § 7, at 1305.
'9 Cal. Stats. 1959, ch. 1112, § 7, at 3194-95.
regulation of marijuana possession is by far the most severe.20  But
even in the face of felony punishment it appears that more and
more arrests are made and convictions obtained in California for the
possession of marijuana.21 Reliable sources claim that use of mari-
juana and its availability are on the upswing.22 These facts tend to
indicate that the statute is punishing offenders without any signifi-
cant deterrent effect.
Timeliness of Constitutional Attack
The question of the constitutionality of the marijuana possession
statute is of more than purely academic interest because of the in-
creasing number of arrests,23 the severity of the punishment, 24 the
inconclusive evidence available on the nature of the drug and its
effects, 25 and the growing public controversy over the entire subject
of marijuana regulation.
Recently there has been increasing debate across the nation over
the harshness of the marijuana possession laws as compared to the
alleged effects of the drug.2 6 The Commissioner of the United States
Food and Drug Administration has said that the "severity of the
penalties is inconsistent with the nature of the drug itself."2 7 The
United States Presidential Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice has called for a reevaluation of the mari-
juana laws.28  Even in the light of increasing arrests and growing
public controversy there is little likelihood of immediate repeal of the
California marijuana possession statute although there is a possibil-
ity that legislation may be introduced making possession of mari-
juana subject to alternative felony-misdemeanor sentencing or re-
ducing the punishment to a misdemeanor.29
20 See Boyko & Rotberg, supra note 4, at 781-85 for a thorough legislative
history of the marijuana possession laws in California.
21 BUREAU OF CRinvim:N STATISTICS, DRUG ARRESTS AND DISPOSITIONS IN
CALIFORNIA 1964, at 51, shows that arrests for possession of marijuana have
tripled since 1960. The report also indicates that juvenile arrests for mari-juana possession have increased over 500% since 1960. Id. at 88.
22 Id. at 10. Testimony of Dr. Joel Fort before a hearing of the Assembly
Committee on Public Health, San Francisco, September 28, 1967. Dr. Fort
has served on the medical staff of the U.S. Public Health Service Hospital in
Lexington, Kentucky, and with the United Nations Division of Narcotic Drugs.
He has been the director of both the Center for Treatment and Education on
Alcoholism in Oakland, California, and the Health Department Center for
Special Problems in San Francisco, California. He is a consultant on drug
addiction to the World Health Organization.
28 See note 21 supra.
24 See text accompanying notes 2-3 supra.
25 For a discussion of the evidence on the nature of marijuana see Boyko
& Rotberg, supra note 4, at 777.
26 See generally THE MARrIUANA PAPERS (Solomon ed. 1966); THE UTOPI-
ATES (Blum ed. 1964). For some historical background on marijuana, see R.
DEROPP, DRUGS AND THE MIND 61-114 (1957).
27 San Francisco Chronicle, Oct. 15, 1967 (This World), at 19, col. 3.
28 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRI1VmE IN A FREE SOCIETY 224-25 (1967).
29 Interview with Mr. Thomas Carroll, consultant to the Assembly Com-
mittee on Criminal Procedure, in San Francisco, California, September 28,
1967.
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Up to the present time there have been no cases raising well-
argued constitutional objections to the California marijuana posses-
sion statute.3 0 Whatever the reason for the scarcity of constitutional
attack, it seems that without legislative action modifying the stat-
ute, constitutional objections will be raised with greater frequency. 31
Constitutional Objections to the Marijuana Possession
Statute-A General View
Two possible constitutional defenses to the California marijuana
possession statute are raised in this comment. The first defense
would bring the possession of marijuana within the right of privacy.
This doctrine of privacy as a substantive bar to a criminal statute
was first recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut 2 and that case will be
used as a starting point for analysis.
The second defense is based on the reasoning of Griswold, not
the holding. This defense would bring possession and use of mari-
juana within other unnamed but fundamental guarantees included in
the amendments to the Constitution.
33
These defenses constitute a two-pronged attack which have the
30 Cases where constitutional objections have been raised include People
v. Mitchell, 244 Cal. App. 2d 176, 52 Cal. Rptr. 884 (1966), which involved a
challenge to CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11530 based on the free exercise
of religion clause of the first amendment. The appeal failed as the defendant
did not show he sincerely believed marijuana was essential to the practice of
his religion and that no antisocial consequences were involved. People v.
Glaser, 238 Cal. App. 2d 819, 48 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1965), and People v. Mistriel,
110 Cal. App. 2d 110, 241 P.2d 1050 (1952), both involved challenges to mari-
juana possession statutes on the ground that due process of law was denied
the appellants since the state had no basis for making marijuana, an allegedly
beneficial herb according to appellants, illegal to possess. The court in each
case decided that since possession of marijuana was a public offense, the
legislative showing of a rational relationship between the statute and the
recognized purpose of the state to legislate for the health, safety and general
welfare of the people was sufficient.
31 Apparently the vast majority of those persons prosecuted under the
statute have defended on theories of illegal search and seizure, e.g., People
v. Reeves, 61 Cal. 2d 268, 391 P.2d 393, 38 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1964), or lack of
knowledge of the actual possession of marijuana, e.g., People v. Redrick, 55
Cal. 2d 282, 359 P.2d 255, 10 Cal. Rptr. 823 (1961) (opium); People v. Perez,
213 Cal. App. 2d 436, 28 Cal. Rptr. 751 (1963). In People v. Rodriguez, 151
Cal. App. 2d 598, 601, 312 P.2d 272, 274 (1957), the court said that it is "es-
sential to the crime . . . that the defendant have physical or constructive
possession, coupled with knowledge of the present and narcotic nature of the
substance."
When the evidence of possession is dubious or sketchy, CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 11556 is often employed. This section makes it a misdemeanor
to visit or be in a place where marijuana is being used. The provision can be
resorted to for practical reasons in charging the defendant who might will-
ingly plead guilty to this offense but would contest felony prosecution under
the possession statute.
32 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
33 For the discussion of fundamental peripheral rights see text accom-
panying notes 64-110 infra.
same origins in the Constitution. 4 The reasoning of Griswold is
basic to both the right of privacy and the other peripheral yet funda-
mental rights. The potential success of these constitutional defenses
will be best understood by a consideration of how the California
courts have applied Griswold and other cases involving personal
rights.
Before discussing the two-pronged attack mentioned above it
should be emphasized that these are not the only possible constitu-
tional objections to the marijuana possession statute. In a proper
case the right to free exercise of religion as expressed in the first
amendment could be used to carve out an exception to the statute as
was done in People v. Woody 35 where a California statute prohibiting
the possession of peyote 36 was under consideration. The right to the
free exercise of religion would be applicable to the marijuana pos-
session statute if a user could show that the use of marijuana was
essential to his religion as well as showing his sincerity in his religious
belief.37
Also it might be argued that the California marijuana possession
statute violates the constitutional guarantee against cruel and unusual
punishment found in the eighth amendment. The statute might be
invalidated by the guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment if
the possession of marijuana is conduct which the court would con-
sider not within the legislative power to punish as a felony. It is the
discrepancy between the conduct and the punishment which makes
the punishment cruel and unusual under the ruling of Robinson v.
California.3" By making possession of marijuana a felony, thus equat-
ing such conduct with the whole spectrum of common law felonies
such as rape, arson, larceny and murder, the statute would seem to be
34 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484, where the Court spells
out its penumbra theory in which the peripheral rights, of which privacy is
one, are expanded.
35 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
36 CAL. HEALTH & SAPETY CoDE § 11500.
37 This was a major point in People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 720-22, 394
P.2d 813, 817-18, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 73-74 (1964). See In re Grady, 61 Cal. 2d
887, 394 P.2d 728, 39 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1964), where the California Supreme
Court granted habeas corpus to a defendant in a peyote possession case and
remanded the case to the trial court on the question of whether defendant's
belief that the use of peyote for religious purposes was honest and bona fide.
But see Leary v. United States, 36 U.S.L.W. 2218 (5th Cir. Sept. 29, 1967),
where appellant, Dr. Timothy Leary, failed to show to the court's satisfaction
that the use of marijuana was essential to his practice of Hinduism; see Finer,
19 HAsTInGS L.J. 667 (1968); State v. Bullard, 267 N.C. 599, 148 S.E.2d 565
(1966), noted in 28 Omo ST. L.J. 369 (1967), where the court refused to follow
the Woody case on the grounds that even if defendant were sincere, the first
amendment would not protect him in his use of marijuana and peyote.
38 370 U.S. 660 (1962). The case struck down as unconstitutional a
California statute making criminal the status of being "addicted to the use
of narcotics." Justice Douglas in a concurring opinion, id. at 676, said: "A
punishment all out of proportion to the offense may bring it within the ban
against 'cruel and unusual punishments.'" See Driver v. Hinnat, 356 F.2d
761 (4th Cir. 1966), and Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir.
1966), where the cruel and unusual punishment argument was successfully
applied to drunkenness prosecutions of alcoholics under local statutes.
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imposing cruel and unusual punishment.5 9
There is also an argument that the classification of marijuana as
a narcotic in section 11001 and the prohibition of possession in sec-
tion 11530 of the California Health and Safety Code violate the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. In order to satisfy
the equal protection guarantee the statute must "cover all persons
who are logically, scientifically or by dint of common sense includ-
able in order to effectuate the legitimate goals of the statute.
'40
Making possession of marijuana illegal, while excluding other eu-
phorics such as alcohol, might be considered a violation of the guaran-
tee of equal protection, by this test.
In considering the constitutional defense of equal protection the
court would have to pass on the legislative policy behind the classifi-
cation, a step which the courts have been reluctant to undertake in
cases where the question of marijuana has arisen.4 1  In the two
cases where the statutory classification of marijuana has been con-
sidered, the court assumed that the classification was rational.42 In
light of recent cases where courts have reviewed legislative policy,
it would seem that a court might now take more initiative in re-
viewing the statutory policy in applying the equal protection test.
43
Although the foregoing discussion demonstrates there are a num-
ber of potential constitutional objections to the California marijuana
possession statutes, 44 this comment will discuss in detail only the
two constitutional attacks raised by the Griswold decision, i.e. the
right of privacy and the other peripheral rights found within the
Bill of Rights. These possible constitutional attacks are more thor-
oughly examined in the next section.
Griswold v. Connecticut
Support from United States Supreme Court cases is necessary in
order to raise the dual attack of the peripheral fundamental rights
and the right of privacy since these rights are not found specifically
in the Constitution. As noted, the leading case supporting the ex-
39 For discussion of the cruel and unusual punishment argument, see
Boyko & Rotberg, supra note 4, at 791.
40 Id. at 787-88.
41 People v. Glaser, 238 Cal. App. 2d 819, 48 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1965); People
v. Mistriel, 110 Cal. App. 2d 110, 241 P.2d 1050 (1952). Both cases are dis-
cussed in note 30 supra.
42 Id.
43 E.g., People v. O'Neil, 62 Cal. 2d 748, 401 P.2d 928, 44 Cal. Rptr. 320
(1965), where the court thoroughly reviewed the legislative policy behind
the statute in determining the legal test for addiction within the meaning of
CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 23105, which prohibits the operation of a motor vehicle
by a narcotic addict; Wollam v. City of Palm Springs, 59 Cal. 2d 276, 379 P.2d
481, 29 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1963), where pursuant to an examination of municipal
policy the court found that there were alternative methods of controlling
traffic congestion other than by the broad regulation of loudspeaker trucks
by the unconstitutional municipal ordinance in issue. See generally McLaugh-
lin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535,
541, 543 (1942).
44 For a general discussion of the constitutional arguments against the
marijuana possession statute, see Boyko & Rotberg, supra note 4, at 785-95.
istence of the right of privacy and the proposition that there exist
other peripheral but fundamental constitutional rights which are not
expressly enumerated in the Constitution is Griswold v. Connecticut.45
Consequently, a thorough understanding of the Griswold decision is
necessary before examining how the California courts have applied it.
The Court in Griswold overturned the Connecticut "anti-birth
control" statute.46 This "uncommonly silly law" as it was called by
Justice Stewart,47 was an antiquated, rarely invoked statute making
it a criminal offense to use birth control devices for the purpose of
preventing conception.48 It was no surprise that the law was in-
validated. The importance of the case lies in the way in which the
statute was held unconstitutional.
Privacy was the basis for the Court's decision,49 and as a sub-
stantive right privacy was raised as a defense to any application of
the Connecticut statute.50 The right of privacy relied on in Gris-
wold is not the procedural right of privacy which protects an in-
dividual from unreasonable searches and seizures employed in enforc-
ing constitutionally valid statutes.5 1 The right of privacy recog-
nized in Griswold is also to be distinguished from the right of privacy
found in the law of torts which allows one to recover monetary com-
pensation for an invasion of his privacy. 52  The right of privacy ap-
plied in Griswold is a direct substantive bar to any statute in ques-
tion.53
In Griswold the Court held that the statute infringed on the zone
of privacy which a married couple possessed.5 4 Within this zone the
couple was free to decide whether or not they would use contracep-
tive devices. 55 Support for this right of privacy was found by looking
to the "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights having penumbras,
formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life
and substance."56 The Court found that the right of privacy protected
in Griswold was created by "several fundamental constitutional
guarantees"57 and based its decision on five of these guarantees con-
tained in the Bill of Rights:
Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of association
45 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
46 Id. at 485.
47 Id. at 527 (dissent).
48 CoNN. GEN. STAT. R v. § 53-32 (1958). "Any person who uses any
drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception
shall be fined not less than fifty dollars or imprisoned not less than sixty days
nor more than one year or be both fined and imprisoned."
49 381 U.S. at 485.
50 Id.
51 E.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961); People v. Cahan, 44 Cal.
2d 434, 438, 282 P.2d 905, 907 (1955), where the court said that "important as
efficient law enforcement may be, it is more important that the right of
privacy ... be respected."
52 See generally W. PROSSER, TORTS § 112, at 829-51 (3d ed. 1964); Warren
& Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890).
5s 381 U.S. at 485.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 484.
57 Id. at 485.
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contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one .... The
Third Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering of sol-
diers "in any house" in time of peace without the consent of the
owner is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment ex-
plicitly affirms the "right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures." The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause ena-
bles the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may
not force him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment
provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people."58
The Court reinforced its argument that penumbral zones of pri-
vacy existed by showing that past decisions had found fundamental
constitutional rights not specifically mentioned in the Constitution. 9
Rights such as freedom of inquiry, freedom of thought, and freedom
to teach were designated as peripheral rights. 60 These rights were
considered essential because "[w]ithout those peripheral rights the
specific rights would be less secure.1
61
While the language of Griswold is broad, the holding itself is
narrow. The case is significant in that six Supreme Court Justices
found a right of privacy within the Constitution.62 Of greater im-
portance than the holding of Griswold is the reasoning of the Court
that the peripheral rights do exist and are essential to the specific
rights.63 A close examination of the California cases is necessary in
considering the scope of privacy and the other peripheral rights.
California's Treatment of Griswold
The rule of Griswold is clear with regard to the right of privacy
in its effect on a statute prohibiting the use of birth control devices.
The question presented here is whether or not possession of mari-
juana can be brought either within the right of privacy, or within any
of the peripheral but fundamental constitutional guarantees. This
58 Id. at 484.
59 Id. at 482-83.
0 Id. at 482, citing Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Wieman v. Upde-
graff, 344 U.S. 183, 195 (1952).
61 381 U.S. at 482-83.
62 Although six justices found privacy, they did not all find it in the same
place in the Constitution. Justices Goldberg, Brennan and Chief Justice War-
ren joined with Justice Douglas in finding privacy supported by fundamental
personal rights found in the penumbra of the Bill of Rights. Such personal
rights are not confined to the specific terms of the Bill of Rights. Id. at 486.
Justices Goldberg, Brennan and Chief Justice Warren went on to use the
ninth amendment as authority for the right of privacy as "there are additional
fundamental rights, protected from governmental infringement which exist
alongside those fundamental rights specifically mentioned in the first eight
constitutional amendments." Id. at 488.
Justice Harlan found support for privacy in the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment. "The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment stands ... on its own bottom." Id. at 500.
Justice White also relied on the fourteenth amendment as the Connecticut
statute deprived married couples of "liberty" without due process of law.
Id. at 502.
68 Id. at 483.
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is the question which will plague the lawyer who has but one signifi-
cant United States Supreme Court decision on the substantive right
of privacy from which to work.
Peripheral but Fundamenial Consitutional Righis
In looking to the California cases the right of privacy as a sub-
stantive right has not been applied by the courts. Instead two Cal-
ifornia cases have cited Griswold for the proposition that broad un-
named peripheral rights exist within the Bill of Rights.64 This reli-
ance on the reasoning of the court in Griswold appears to be the
significance of that case to the California courts although it may be
that the proper fact situation has not come before the courts where
the right of privacy might be applicable. An examination of the
actual California cases will better indicate if these two attacks are
applicable to the marijuana possession statute.
A key California case using Griswold as authority is In re Klor.6 5
The case involved construction of section 311.2 of the California
Penal Code dealing with preparation and distribution of obscene ma-
terial.6 The trial court interpreted the statute to mean that the ac-
cused was guilty if he prepared the obscene photographs found in his
possession or intended to distribute the photographs. The alleged
error in the trial court's instruction was allowing the jury to find
the accused guilty for mere preparation and possession of the ob-
scene material without the essential intent to distribute it.6 7
The California Supreme Court in Klor held that this construction
given by the judge in his instructions to the jury was not what the
legislature intended and would attribute to the statute an un-
warranted unconstitutional extension.68 The court said that "[n]o
constitutionally punishable conduct appears in the case of an in-
dividual who prepared material for his own use or for such personal
satisfaction as its creation affords him."69 Griswold was cited in sup-
port of the court's statement that the judge's instruction would be
clearly unconstitutional.
The court's theory seems to be that the purpose of the obscenity
statute is to prohibit possession of obscene material with the intent
to distribute it. 7 1 This is conduct which is clearly within the legisla-
tive power to sanction criminally.72  On the other hand possession
64 In re Klor, 64 Cal. 2d 816, 820, 415 P.2d 791, 794, 51 Cal. Rptr. 903, 906
(1966); Finot v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 250 Cal. App. 2d 226, 235, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 520, 527 (1967).
65 64 Cal. 2d 816, 415 P.2d 791, 51 Cal. Rptr. 903 (1966).
66 CAL. PEN. CODE § 311.2 reads: "Every person who knowingly: ...
prepares, publishes, prints, exhibits, distributes, or offers to distribute, or has
in his possession with intent to distribute or to exhibit or offer to distribute,
any obscene matter is guilty of a misdemeanor."
67 64 Cal. 2d at 818-19, 415 P.2d at 792-93, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 904-05.
68 Id. at 818, 415 P.2d at 792, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 904.
69 Id. at 821, 415 P.2d at 794, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
70 Id. at 820, 415 P.2d at 794, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
71 For discussion see id. at 820-21, 415 P.2d at 794-95, 51 Cal. Rptr. at
906-07.
72 Id. at 819-20, 415 P.2d at 793-94, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 905-06.
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without the necessary intent to distribute the obscene photographs
must be distinguished. Mere possession of the photographic material,
obscene or not, is conduct so essential to the first amendment's free-
dom of expression that it lies within a constitutionally protected
area and therefore is not subject to criminal sanction. 73
A square decision on the constitutionality of the statute was
avoided by the court in Kior. Instead, the statute was construed in
such a way as to avoid finding it unconstitutional. 74  Nevertheless
it seems that the statement by the court that possession of obscene
material for one's own use or satisfaction would be constitutionally
protected is as much a part of the holding of the case as the con-
struction of the statute.75
Finot v. Pasadena City Board of Education76 is a well considered
case which finds protected personal rights in the periphery of the
constitutional amendments using Griswold as authority.77 In Finot
the California Court of Appeal held that a high school teacher could
wear a beard without losing his job.78  This right to wear a beard
came within the periphery of the first amendment right of free
speech.79 The wearing of a beard, while not speech, is expression
through nonverbal conduct which is brought within the scope of
the right of free speech. 0 The court in Finot emphasized this point:
It seems to us that the wearing of a beard is a form of expression of
an individual's personality and that such a right of expression, al-
though probably not within the literal scope of the First Amendment
itself, is as much entitled to its peripheral protection as the personal
rights established ... with respect to the right of parents to educate
their children as they see fit.81
The wearing of a beard was also held to be a liberty protected by
the due process provisions of the state and federal constitutions.8 2
The court considered this right to be one of the "constitutionally
unnamed but constitutionally protected personal liberties. '8 3
73 Id. at 821, 415 P.2d at 794, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
74 Id. at 821, 415 P.2d at 795, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 907, where the court said:
"A fundamental canon of statutory interpretation requires that a statute be
construed to avoid unconstitutionality if it can reasonably be so interpreted."
75 The court said, id. at 818, 415 P.2d at 792, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 904: "We
hold that the construction placed on the statute by the trial court does vio-
lence to the legislative intent and, moreover, would attribute to the statute
a gratuitous unconstitutional reach." For a similar case using Klor as author-
ity, see People v. Samuels, 250 A.C.A. 571, 58 Cal. Rptr. 439 (1967). See also
State v. Wetzel, 173 Ohio St. 16, 179 N.E.2d 773 (1962), which held that the
Ohio obscenity statute does not prohibit the mere possession of obscene ma-
terial for private gratification. The requisite intent to distribute the material
is necessary.
76 250 A.C.A. 226, 58 Cal. Rptr. 520 (1967).
77 Id. at 235, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 527.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
si Id. (emphasis added). The cases cited by the court and omitted from
the quotation recognize a fourteenth amendment "liberty" to educate one's
children as one desires. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
82 250 A.C.A. 226, 234, 58 Cal. Rptr. 520, 526 (1967), relying on U.S.
CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1; CAL. CoNsT. art. 1, § 13.
83 Id. at 235, 58 Cal. Rptr. 526-27.
By a careful reading of the Klor s 4 and Finot 5 cases it is appar-
ent that the California courts are using Griswold as authority for the
proposition that fundamental peripheral rights exist within the spe
cific amendments of the Bill of Rights. This approach used by the
California courts may be the significance of the Griswold decision in
the near future. Instead of finding a right of privacy and relying on
the holding of Griswold,86 the reviewing court can rely on the rea-
soning of Griswold that there are broader constitutional rights than
those embodied in the amendments themselves.8 7 For this approach
Griswold v. Connecticut is authority, and indeed very good authority 8
Notwithstanding the persuasiveness of the Griswold decision
that peripheral fundamental rights are necessary and present,8 9 the
real problem is to demonstrate that possession of marijuana factually
comes within these peripheral rights. By considering the nature of
marijuana, the reasons for its use and the conduct punished by the
statute (i.e. mere possession), it would seem that possession of mari-
juana could be brought within a constitutional right.
Possession of marijuana is conduct essential to its use. This type
of possession is conduct wholly personal to the user or the possessor
since no one else is involved. If possession of obscene literature is
protected by the first amendment under the freedom of expression
as it was in Klor,90 it is difficult to distinguish the possession of
marijuana factually. Expression through the taking of photographs
as was the case in Klor and expression through the use of marijuana
are both forms of sensory perception. -It would seem that possession
as conduct absolutely necessary to such personal expression should
come within the first amendment whether it is obscene material or
marijuana which is possessed.
Possession of marijuana might be protected as a fundamental
liberty within the due process clause of the fifth or fourteenth
amendment. The court in Finot v. Pasadena City Board of Educa-
tion91 held that the wearing of a beard was a liberty within the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment as well as conduct which
came within freedom of expression guaranteed by the first amend-
ment.92  Reliance was placed on the United States Supreme Court
84 64 Cal. 2d 816, 820, 415 P.2d 791, 794, 51 Cal. Rptr. 903, 906 (1966),
citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965).
85 250 A.C.A. 226, 235, 58 Cal. Rptr. 520, 527 (1967), citing Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-83 (1965).
86 The Griswold decision has been criticized as ill-founded and vague.
See for example, the dissent of Justice Black in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 507 (1965); Kauper, Penumbras, Peripheries, Emanations, Things
Fundamental and Things Forgotten: The Griswold Case, 64 M1cH. L. REv. 235,
244, 252 (1965).
87 381 U.S. at 482-83.
88 It is quite easy to come to the unwarranted conclusion that the cita-
tion of a court to Griswold is a recognition of the right of privacy: See Boyko
& Rotberg, supra note 4, at 794, where the authors did just that.
89 For a discussion, see 381 U.S. at 482-83.
90 64 Cal. 2d at 820, 415 P.2d at 794, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
91 250 A.C.A. 226, 58 Cal. Rptr. 520 (1967).
92 Id. at 235, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 527.
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decision of Kent v. Dulles93 where the Court said: "[Travel] may be
as close to the heart of the individual as the choice of what he eats, or
wears, or reads. ' 94 Just as the court in Finot found that appellant
had a right to wear a beard which could not be denied him in the
absence of a compelling interest on the part of the state,95 the user of
marijuana who smokes or ingests it might bring himself within the
scope of the personal liberties of the due process clause of the fifth or
fourteenth amendment by similar reasoning.96
The Right of Privacy
The right of privacy as a substantive bar to a criminal statute
has not been specifically adopted by the California courts in any par-
ticular case. In cases where privacy might have been applied, other
more historically protected constitutional rights have been relied
upon. For example, as has been noted, Klor and Finot relied on the
freedom of expression in safeguarding the possession of obscene ma-
terial and the wearing of a beard. In People v. Woody9 7 the free exer-
cise of religion was another long protected constitutional right
which the court applied to protect the use of peyote by the members of
the Native American Church.
In the absence of California cases the right of privacy as a sub-
stantive guarantee has only Griswold v. Connecticut to support it.
Earlier United States Supreme Court cases have indicated that within
the "spirit" of the Constitution privacy has long been recognized. 8
Justice Brandeis emphasized this in his dissent in Olmstead v. United
States: 99
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the signifi-
cance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect.
They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of
life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect
Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their
sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to
be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men.' 00
The problem raised with respect to the marijuana possession stat-
ute and the Griswold decision is the extension of the zone of privacy
from the "sacred precincts of marital bedrooms"'101 to an individual
who purposefully induces a mild hallucinatory mental condition
through the use of marijuana.
Just as there is now a zone of marital privacy, there are in-
dividual zones of privacy which the Court in Griswold went to
93 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
94 Id. at 126 (emphasis added).
05 250 A.C.A. at 238, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 529.
96 See In re Luera, 28 Cal. App. 185, 152 P. 738 (1915), discussed in note
8 supra.97 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 68 (1964).
98 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
99 277 U.S. at 478.
100 Id. (emphasis added).
101 381 U.S. at 485.
great lengths to describe. 0 2  Just as the individual may express
himself graphically, 0 3 verbally, 0 4 and physically 0 5 in certain con-
stitutionally protected ways, it can be argued that the individual has
a zone of privacy in which he can express himself mentally through
the use of marijuana. It may be for spiritual purposes, as was the
case in People v. Woody, 0 6 or for the mere enjoyment of the experi-
ence. Griswold certainly indicates that a zone of privacy exists with
respect to conduct essential to free expression.0 7  For the reason
that expression dealing solely with the mind is the most private form
of expression possible, it is submitted that possession of marijuana as
a necessary incident to its use is conduct which could be brought
within the zone of privacy which exists within the first amendment.
With more decisions defining the contours of the right of privacy, the
step to possession of marijuana could be made.
Certainly the recent cases which have been decided in California
such as In re Klor and Finot v. Pasadena City Board of Education
might have applied the right of privacy as a constitutional defense.
Instead, as noted earlier, 08 the cases were decided on the basis of
rights found in the periphery of the first amendment. It is not sur-
prising that a court would apply a long protected and more specific
right such as the freedom of expression rather than the recently
enunciated right of privacy. This was clearly the choice of the court
in Finot when it said with respect to the right of privacy:
[T] he unnamed rights retained by the people under the Ninth Amend-
ment generally have received little, if any, specification as such by
the United States Supreme Court .... [W]e deem it unnecessary
to decide whether appellant's right to wear a beard while engaged in
classroom teaching ... is protected by the Fourth, Fifth and Ninth
Amendments to the United States Constitution .... 109
It is evident from Finot and Klor that the California courts are
reluctant to apply the right of privacy as the sole constitutional basis
for a decision.10 It seems that the right of privacy has been and
will be treated only as an additional basis for a court's decision until
the United States Supreme Court further defines the right of pri-
vacy or a case is raised where the California courts have no alterna-
tive but to apply or reject it. The California marijuana possession
statute may present such a case.
Personal Rights in Conflict with the Police Power of the State
If a court were to find that possession of marijuana for personal
use was within one of the constitutional rights raised above, the mari-juana possession statute would not be automatically invalidated. In
102 Id. at 484.
103 E.g., In re Klor, 64 Cal. 2d 816, 415 P.2d 791, 51 Cal. Rptr. 903 (1966);
People v. Samuels, 250 A.C.A. 571, 58 Cal. Rptr. 439 (1967).
104 E.g., Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948); Wollam v. City of Palm
Springs, 59 Cal. 2d 276, 379 P.2d 481, 29 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1963).
105 E.g., DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (freedom of assembly).
106 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
107 See 381 U.S. at 484.
108 Text accompanying notes 84-88 supra.
109 250 A.C.A. at 233, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 525.
110 See text accompanying notes 84-88 supra.
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order to hold the statute unconstitutional the court must also find
that the state has no valid reason for prohibiting such conduct.,'"
Consequently, it is important to examine the general approach of the
courts in handling constitutional questions in which personal liberties
are limited by state law.
There seems to be a very similar analysis of questions involving
state infringements upon personal liberties by both the United
States Supreme Court and the California courts. In this section the
approach of the California courts to such constitutional questions is
examined generally with the specific consideration of the marijuana
possession statute raised in a later section." 2
The Bagley v. Washington Township Tesis
The California Supreme Court expressly provided a three-step
analysis for questions involving state infringement of personal lib-
erties in Bagley v. Washington Township." 3 This analysis empha-
sizes that the state must justify its infringement of the individual's
rights by showing a compelling interest and that the infringement.
even if justified, must be as narrowly worded as possible. 114 In
Bagley Justice Tobriner speaking for the court laid down the tests:
[W] e hold that a governmental agency which would require a waiver
of constitutional rights as a condition of public employment must
demonstrate: (1) that the political restraints rationally relate to the
enhancement of the public service, (2) that the benefits which the
public gains by the restraints outweigh the resulting impairment of
constitutional rights, and (3) that no alternatives less subversive of
constitutional rights are available." 5
This test has been followed expressly in Finot v. Pasadena City
Board of Education"6 and in other cases involving the right of gov-
ernment employees to keep their jobs irrespective of their political
activities" 7 as well as in a case involving recipients of social welfare
benefits." 8
While the tests of the Bagley decision have not been expressly
set out in a decision protecting the personal liberties of an individual
citizen who is not a government employee or one receiving govern-
ment benefits, such tests would seem to apply to criminal legislation.
The language of the California Supreme Court in People v. Woody" 9
shows that the Bagley type of reasoning is present with special em-
111 See text accompanying notes 119-25 infra.
112 See text accompanying notes 148-78 infra.
113 65 Cal. 2d 499, 501-02, 421 P.2d 409, 411, 55 Cal. Rptr. 401, 402 (1966).
The case involved the permissible limits of public restrictions on political
activities of public employees under the first amendment.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 250 A.C.A. 226, 236, 58 Cal. Rptr. 520, 527 (1967).
117 E.g., Rosenfield v. Malcolm, 65 Cal. 2d 559, 561, 421 P.2d 697, 698, 55
Cal. Rptr. 505, 506 (1967).
.18 Parrish v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 66 A.C. 253, 425 P.2d 223, 57 Cal. Rptr.
623 (1967); 18 HASTINGs L.J. 228 (1966); see Emerson, Nine Justices in Search
of a Doctrine, 64 MicH. L. REv. 219, 233 (1965). Professor Emerson was coun-
sel for appellant in the Griswold case.
119 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
phasis on the state's compelling interest in a case where no state
benefit is in issue. The Woody case is an excellent example of the
court's refusal to go off on the mere rational relation of the statute
to the state's avowed purpose. 20 Instead the court applied the tech-
nique of balancing the infringement on the personal liberty against
the interest of the state in regulating the individual's conduct. 121
The defendant in Woody was convicted for possession of peyote,122
but contended that the law conflicted with his use of it as a form of
religious expression as a member of the Native American Church.
The court, considering the record independently,123 examined the
conflicting interests of the state and the individual and reversed the
conviction. 124 For the court Justice Tobriner stated:
We have weighed the competing values represented in this case
on the symbolic scale of constitutionality. On the one side we have
placed the weight of freedom of religion as protected by the First
Amendment; on the other, the weight of the state's "compelling in-
terest." Since the use of peyote incorporates the essence of the reli-
gious expression, the first weight is heavy. Yet the use of peyote
presents only slight danger to the state and to the enforcement of its
laws; the second weight is relatively light. The scale tips in favor of
the constitutional protection.125
The burden on the state to show a compelling interest why per-
sonal liberties should be impaired is found in many United States
Supreme Court decisions as well.126  For example in GriswoZd v.
Connecticut the Court rejected the minimum rationality standard
and reviewed the judgment of the state legislature. 27  Justice Gold-
120 Id. at 722-23, 394 P.2d at 818-19, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 74-75.
121 Id.
122 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CoDE § 11500 makes possession of any narcotic
other than marijuana a felony. For the planting provisions, see CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE § 11540. Peyote grows in small buds on the top of a small;
spineless cactus, Lophorphora williamsii, in Texas and northern Mexico. When
taken internally, it causes vivid hallucinations and beyond this its users
experience greater comprehension and even a sense of friendliness towards
others. People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 720, 394 P.2d 813, 816, 40 Cal. Rptr.
69, 72 (1964).
123 61 Cal. 2d at 722, 394 P.2d at 818, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
124 Id. at 727, 394 P.2d at 821, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 77.
125 Id.
126 E.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964); Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963); Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigative
Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438-39
(1963); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960).
127 381 U.S. at 482. In cases where economic interests are involved, the
Supreme Court has invoked the minimum rationality standard holding that
as long as the state law in question is rationally related to some permissible
purpose within the police power of the state, the exercise of power is con-
stitutional. E.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955);
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905). The California courts have
applied this standard to two of its drug statutes. In re Yun Quong, 159 Cal.
508, 114 P. 835 (1911) (possession of opium); People v. Glaser, 238 Cal. App.
2d 819, 48 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1965); People v. Mistriel, 110 Cal. App. 2d 110, 241
P.2d 1050 (1952) (possession of marijuana).
The reasoning behind this standard lies in the reluctance of the courts to
substitute their judgment for that of the state legislature thereby usurping
the primary function of the legislature. In Purity Extract & Toxic Co. v.
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berg gave the reason for this in a concurring opinion:
In a long series of cases this Court has held that where funda-
mental personal liberties are involved, they may not be abridged by
the States simply on a showing that a regulatory statute has some
rational relationship to the effectuation of a proper state purpose.
"Where there is a significant encroachment upon personal liberty, the
State may prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest which
is compelling."' 28
In Griswold the alleged purpose of the Connecticut legislature
was to discourage extramarital relations and the statute rationally re-
lated to this purpose.-29  In spite of the rational relationship, the
state did not carry the burden of demonstrating that the purpose of
the statute was compelling enough to warrant the infringement of
the individual right of privacy. 30
Even when a compelling interest is shown by the state, a further
test must be satisfied. This is the test enumerated in Bagley that
there must be no alternative less subversive of constitutional rights
available.' 3 ' Under this test even when the state has a "compelling
interest" strong enough to outweigh the intrusion into the citizen's
rights, outright prohibition is not permitted if there is a suitable al-
ternative.132  California recognized this rule in Wollam v. City of
Palm Springs. 33  In Wollam a city ordinance banning the use of
sound trucks was held unconstitutional as it was too broad a criminal
sanction.1 34 The court stated:
An ordinance narrowly drawn may properly reach to the evils which
it. seeks to avoid. Instead, here, the ordinance sweeps within its
broad ambit the constitutional right to tell a whole story by means
of this method of communication.35
The broad sweep of the Connecticut statute was also a major
point in Griswold 3 and Justice Douglas emphasized it in the ma-
jority opinion when he said:
[A] "governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitu-
tionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means
which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of
protected freedoms."137
Lynch, 226 U.S. 192, 201-02 (1912) the Court said: "[U]nless it clearly ap-
pears that the enactment has no substantial relation to a proper purpose, it
cannot be said that the limit of legislative power has been transcended. To
hold otherwise would be to substitute judicial opinion of expediency for the
will of the legislature,-a notion foreign to our constitutional system." See
also Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 205 (1887).
128 381 U.S. at 497, quoting from Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524
(1960).
129 381 U.S. at 498, 505-06.
130 Id. at 497-98, where Justice Goldberg said in a concurring opinion:
"Although the Connecticut birth control law obviously encroaches upon a
fundamental personal liberty, the State does not show that the law serves any
'subordinating [state] interest which is compelling' or that is 'necessary
to the accomplishment of a permissible state policy.'"
'31 65 Cal. 2d at 501-02, 421 P.2d at 411, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 402.
132 Id. See also note 150 infra.
133 59 Cal. 2d 276, 379 P.2d 481, 29 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1963); see Saia v. New
York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948).
134 59 Cal. 2d at 288, 379 P.2d at 488, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 8.
,35 Id.
136 381 U.S. at 485.
'37 Id., quoting from NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964); see
The Connecticut legislature sought to attain its avowed purpose
through means which had a "maximum destructive impact" on the
rights of an individual. 138 In such a situation narrower means are
appropriate to achieve the same ends.139
Independent Review of ihe Record
When constitutional questions have been presented involving
personal liberties, the California Supreme Court has relied on its own
evaluation of scientific facts and expert testimony by independently
reviewing the whole record.140 This has also been the approach taken
in some United States Supreme Court cases.1 41 The courts review the
entire record because a constitutional question involving the "com-
pelling interest" of a state is a mixed question of law and fact.142
Therefore the question before the court is subject to a constitutionaljudgment in which the lower court's findings are not binding upon
the appellate court.143
A California example of this procedure is People v. Woody where
the court looked at the whole record and drew its own inferences
from the facts and expert testimony in holding that peyote could
not work a permanent deleterious injury on the user.1 44  This was
contrary to the decision of the trial court. The court in Woody
said:
The state asserts that the compelling reason for the prohibition
of Peyotism lies in its deleterious effects .... We set forth the rea-
sons why we believe the contentions to be unfounded.
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960), where the Court said: "[E]ven
though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose
cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties
when the end can be more narrowly achieved."
138 381 U.S. at 485.
139 Id.; see, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 63 (1960);
Fort v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 61 Cal. 2d 331, 339, 392 P.2d 385, 389, 38 Cal. Rptr.
625, 629 (1964).
140 See, e.g., People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 720-23, 394 P.2d 813, 816-19,
40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 73-75 (1964); People v. O'Neil, 62 Cal. 2d 748, 401 P.2d 928,
44 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1965), where the court looked to outside sources to deter-
mine the definition of a narcotic addict within the meaning of CAL. VEHICLE
CoDE § 23105.
141 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 668-69 (1962) (Douglas, J., con-
curring).
142 In reviewing the state's "compelling interest" the court must look to
the facts the state has relied on to see if such facts are sufficient to permit
an impairment of the individual's constitutional rights. For discussions, see
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963); People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716,
722, 394 P.2d 813, 818, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 74 (1964).
143 People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 722, 394 P.2d 813, 818, 40 Cal. Rptr.
69, 74 (1964). See also the dissent of Harlan, J. in Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 497-98 (1957), where he said of the Court's determination of an
obscenity issue: "I do not understand how the Court can resolve the con-
stitutional problems now before it without making its own independent judg-
ment upon the character of the material upon which these convictions were
based."
144 61 Cal. 2d at 722, 394 P.2d at 818, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
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The record ... does not support the state's chronicle of harmful
consequences of the use of peyote.145
Were the marijuana possession statute to be attacked as depriv-
ing an individual of his right of privacy or of one of the other pe-
ripheral but fundamental rights, it would appear that the reviewing
court would take under consideration the entire record for inde-
pendent judgment on the constitutional question.146 The court would
then apply the test laid down in Bagley v. Washington Township147
in analyzing the constitutionality of the statute.
The State's Compelling Inieresi: What Dangers Does
Marijuana Hold for ihe User and Society?
As this discussion has indicated, even if a court were to find that
possession of marijuana comes within the right of privacy or could be
included as one of the unnamed but constitutionally protected rights,
there would be no assurance that the marijuana possession statute
would be declared unconstitutional. 148  If the state can successfully
show a "compelling interest"'149 why it can abridge a personal right
by methods which are not unnecessarily broad'51 the statute will
stand. For this reason it is important to examine the facts and in-
formation available which might be introduced into the record as evi-
dence concerning marijuana and its effects on the user and society.
By the presence of such evidence in the record an appellate court
could independently examine the record in making its decision' 51 as
was the case in People v. Woody.152
It is not within the scope of this comment to delve in detail into
the factual bases of the arguments for and against marijuana. This
has been done elsewhere.1 53  This section will briefly outline and
analyze some of the leading arguments which law enforcement agen-
145 Id. (emphasis added). The court, id. at 720, 394 P.2d at 816, 40 Cal.
Rptr. at 72, also said: "An examination of the record as to the nature of
peyote and its role in the religion practiced by defendants . . . compels the
conclusion that the statutory prohibition most seriously infringes upon the
observance of the religion." (emphasis added). For the view of the Califor-
nia Attorney General's Office to the contrary, see 39 OPs. CAL. ATT'y GEN. 276
(1962).
146 See cases cited notes 140-41 supra.
147 65 Cal. 2d at 501-02, 421 P.2d at 411, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 402. See text
accompanying note 115 supra.
148 See text accompanying note 111 supra.
149 Cases cited note 126 supra.
150 Cases cited note 139 supra. It would seem that the presence of alter-
natives less subversive of the individual liberty is really part of the com-
pelling interest argument. The state cannot have a "compelling interest"
strong enough to outweigh the infringement on one's personal liberties if
there are other alternatives less subversive to constitutional rights available.
See text accompanying notes 131-32 supra.
151 See text accompanying notes 131-32 supra.
152 61 Cal. 2d at 722, 394 P.2d at 818, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
153 Boyko & Rotberg, supra note 4, at 775-81. See id. at 783 n.44 for cita-
tions to authorities supporting the present method of regulating marijuana.
cies,154 legislative committees, 15 5 and others' 56 have advanced as rea-
sons why the use and possession of marijuana should remain illegal.
It must be emphasized that the body of available research concern-
ing marijuana is not extensive and the results are quite incon-
clusive. 57  This is particularly evident when the information con-
cerning marijuana is compared with what is known about other sub-
stances such as alcohol, tobacco and the hard narcotics such as mor-
phine, heroin and cocaine.' s
The three most frequently advanced and widely publicized
arguments against the use of marijuana and therefore its possession,
are: (1) that the use of marijuana leads to criminal acts, (2) that
the use of marijuana is a steppingstone to addiction to more serious
drugs, and (3) that marijuana's use is per se harmful to the user.'5 9
Criminal Activity
The charge that the use of marijuana leads to criminal acts must
be divided into two parts. The first argument is that a person under
the influence of marijuana is likely to commit serious crimes. This
view is roundly criticized in the LaGuardia Report.10 Although
published in 1944 the LaGuardia Report is the only extensive, au-
thoritative study on marijuana and its consequences.
The statistics that the majority of marijuana users arrested are
first offenders:'( do not support the charge that it leads to an in-
'crease in criminal acts. Such statistics simply show that the use of
marijuana may lead to being arrested for the criminal offense of
possession of marijuana.
154 E.g., BUREAU OF NARcoTIc ENFORCEMENT, THE NARcOTIc PROBLEM: A
BRIF STUDY 12 (4th ed. 1965).
155 Hearings on Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Before the California
Assembly Interim Comm. on Criminal Procedure 24 (1963); CAIFORNIA STATE
ASSEMBLY INTERIM CoM\nM. oN PUBLIC HEALTH, REPORT OF SUBCOMM. ON NAR-
coTics AND DANGEROUS DRUGS 11-15 (1959).
156 Boyko & Rotberg,.supra note 4, at 783 n.44.
157 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JusTicE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 224-25 (1967).
158 The only authoritative study on marijuana in the United States is the
report by the MAyoR's COMMITTEE ON MARIHUANA, THE MARIHUANA PROBLEM
IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK (1944). Better known as the LaGuardia Report, it
is based on a controlled study of regular marijuana users in New York City
in 1944. The significant parts of the LaGuardia Report are reprinted in THE
MARIJUANA PAPES 233-360 (Solomon ed. 1966). Reference will be made to
that source.
159 Boyko & Rotberg, supra note 4, at 775-81.
160 Conclusions 10 and 11 by the MAYoR's COvMITTE ON MARIHUANA, in
THE MARIJUANA PAPERS, supra note 158, at 260 read: "Marihuana is not a
determining factor in the commission of major crimes .... Juvenile delin-
quency is not associated with the practice of smoking marihuana ... " For
views to the contrary, see H. ANSLINGER & W. TOMPKINs, THE TRAFFIC IN NAR-
cOTICS 18-26 (1953); THE MARIJUANA PAPERS 439 (Solomon ed. 1966).
161 BUREAU OF CRIMINAL STATISTICS, DRUG ARRESTS AND DISPOSITIONS IN
CAIFONIA 1966 at 63. This report indicates that 65.3% of those adults
arrested for possession of marijuana had no prior record, and 22.1% had only
a record for minor offenses.
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The second part of the charge is that the use of marijuana intro-
duces the user into a criminal underworld. If this is so, it is because
the use' 62 and possession' 63 of marijuana are illegal. The user is
naturally going to be involved with those who supply and sell mari-
juana. Also marijuana is not addictive as recognized by statute in
California'" and by the legal tests of addiction laid down in recent
cases.165 Therefore the user will not be driven to illegal means to
acquire it.
Marijuana as a Steppingstone to Addictive Narcotics
The argument that the use of marijuana leads to heroin addiction
and addiction to other disabling drugs has been made by California
law enforcement agencies and legislative committees.16 6 Recent offi-
cial state sources discredit this argument. 167 In addition one of the
leading texts on pharmacology states that marijuana habituation
does not lead to the use of heroin.168
Harm to the User
The harmful effects which marijuana might have on the user is
one of the most important yet least researched problems. Before
considering the physiological effects, if any, which marijuana may
have, it is pertinent to examine the immediate psychological effects
a person experiences after use. It is for these mental reactions or
effects that marijuana is taken. Dr. Joel Fort, a leading authority
in the field of drugs,169 has described these reactions:
Marijuana is taken for euphoria, reduction of fatigue, and relief of
tension .... Small to moderate doses also increase appetite, distort
the time sense, increase self-confidence and, like alcohol, can relax
some inhibitions.17 6
This description is remarkably similar to the reasons why the
162 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11721.
163 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11530.
164 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 3009. The statute is set out in note 6
supra.
100 People v. O'Neil, 62 Cal. 2d 748, 755, 401 P.2d 928, 932, 44 Cal. Rptr.
320, 324 (1965) (distinguishing habituation from addiction); People v. Victor,
62 Cal. 2d 280, 302-04, 398 P.2d 391, 405-06, 42 Cal. Rptr. 199, 213-14 (1965).
Both cases hold that an addict must be one who is physically and emotionally
dependent on a narcotic as well as having developed a tolerance for the drug.
166 BUREAu OF NARCOTIC ENFORCEMENT, THE NARCOTIC PROBLEM: A BRIEF
STUDY 12 (4th ed. 1965); CALIFORNIA STATE ASSEMBLY INTERIM COMM. ON
PUBLIc HEALTH, REPORT OF SUBCOMM. ON NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS DRUGS
11-15 (1959).
167 BUREAu OF CRIMINAL STATISTICS, DRUG ARRESTS AND DRUG DISPOSITIONS
IN CALIFORNIA 1964 at 10. It has been suggested that addiction to narcotics
is based on the user's own psychological structure and his environment rather
than the fact that he once used marijuana. See Clausen, Social and Psycho-
logical Factors in Narcotics Addiction, 22 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 34, 43 (1957).
168 L. GOODMAN & A. GILMAN, THE PHARMACOLOGICAL BASIS OF THERAPEU-
Tics 300 (3d ed. 1965).
169 See note 22 supra for a description of Dr. Fort's qualifications.
170 Fort, Social and Legal Response to Pleasure-giving Drugs, in THE
UTOPATEs 213-14 (Blum ed. 1964).
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average individual has a cocktail before dinner.
According to the LaGuardia Report the psychological effects of
marijuana are only temporary and:
[N]either the ingestion of marihuana nor the smoking of marihuana
cigarettes affects the basic outlook of the individual except in a very
few instances and to a very slight degree .... In other words, reac-
tions which are natively alien to the individual cannot be induced by
the ingestion or smoking of the drug."7
Concerning the more serious question of the permanent effects
which marijuana may have on the user, there is very little in-
formation available.172 The LaGuardia Report did not find any direct
effect on the organs of the body aside from the psychological ex-
periences temporarily induced by marijuana. 73 Dr. Fort is in accord
with this view:
[U]nlike alcohol marijuana does not produce, even with prolonged
or excessive use, addiction or irreversible physical damage to the
body, although dependency or habituation and toxic effects can
occur."
7 4
It is also significant in considering possible harm to the user to
remember that California by statute and case law in 1965 recognized
that marijuana itself was not an addictive drug."' 5
Clearly the evidence of the effects of marijuana on the user and
society is insufficient and inconclusive. While lawyers and judges
may speculate on the medical and sociological effects of marijuana,
there does remain the fact that possession of marijuana is a felony in
California.' 6 While it would be preferable to have more evidence
on the subject, the statute should be considered in the light of those
facts presently available. As one of the few legal articles on mari-
juana has said:
Serious questions as to the soundness of legislative judgment arise
when the abusive drinker faces few and minor penalties and a ciga-
rette smoker is prompted and cajoled to incur the risk of fatal or
incapacitating disease, while, in contrast, onerous reprisals await the
marijuana smoker merely for privately using or having possession or
control of the drug."77
Inconclusive facts, ignorance and fear of the effects of marijuana
are not proper bases for making possession of marijuana criminal and
certainly not for making possession of marijuana a felony. s
171 THE MARIJUANA PAPERS, supra note 158, at 334.
172 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIMIE IN A FREE SOcIETY 224-25 (1967).
173 THE MARiJUANA PAPERS, supra note 158, at 284.
"74 Fort, supra note 170, at 213.
175 See notes 164-65 supra.
176 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11530.
"77 Boyko & Rotberg, supra note 4, at 781.
178 At least one writer feels that the attitude taken towards marijuana in
the United States stems from the puritan work ethic and its intolerance of
inaction. Murphy, The Cannabis Habit: A Review of Recent Psychiatric
Literature, 15 U.N. BULL. ON NARCOTICS 20 (1963). See also W. ELDRmGE, NAR-
COTICS AND THE LAW 13-34 (1962), for the same view with respect to all drugs.
These views would suggest the various reasons given for the illegality of
marijuana are nothing more than convenient rationalizations when compared
with the permissive treatment which alcohol and tobacco receive under the
law.
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Conclusion
A constitutional attack on the marijuana possession statute would
be extremely timely. Considering the legislative inertia in this area,
1
'
79
the harsh penalty assessed for marijuana possession,8 0 the recent
development of California case law with respect to personal rights as
evidenced in People v. Woody,181 In re Klor,182 and Finot v. Pasa-
dena City Board of Education,183 a constitutional objection raised to
the marijuana possession statute should receive prompt and perhaps
sympathetic judicial consideration. 8 4
It is submitted that the advocate would have to emphasize the
following points in presenting his case:
(1) Possession of marijuana for mere personal use comes within
one of the peripheral but fundamental constitutional rights. Finot
v. Pasadena City Board of Education and In re Klor are authority for
inclusion of possession as conduct essential to a means of expression
within the first amendment's periphery. Finot might also be used as
authority for calling the right to possess marijuana a constitutional
"liberty" within the fourteenth amendment.185 In order to bring
marijuana within a zone of privacy also implicit in the first and other
amendments, Griswold v. Connecticut'8 6 is the proper authority.
(2) Once the possession of marijuana is considered to be a
fundamental constitutional right, then the balancing of the state's
interest against the infringement of the individual's rights is in issue.
The test of Bagley v. Washington Township is in point. The state
179 See text accompanying note 29 supra.
180 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11530.
181 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
182 64 Cal. 2d 816, 415 P.2d 791, 51 Cal. Rptr. 903 (1966).
183 250 A.C.A. 226, 58 Cal. Rptr. 520 (1967).
184 It would seem significant that most of the California Supreme Court
opinions involving personal liberties are presently being written by Justice
Tobriner. In these opinions Justice Tobriner has reflected a deep concern for
the individual and his creative spirit in the same vein that Justice Douglas
has in his United States Supreme Court opinions. See, e.g., People v. Woody,
61 Cal. 2d 716, 727-28, 394 P.2d 813, 821-22, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 77-78 (1964),
where Justice Tobriner said: "In a mass society which presses at every
point toward conformity, the protection of self-expression, however unique,
of the individual and the group becomes ever more important. The varying
currents of the subcultures that flow into the mainstream of our national life
give it depth and beauty. We preserve a greater value than an ancient tradi-
tion when we protect the rights of the Indians who honestly practiced an old
religion in using peyote one night at a meeting in a desert hogan. .. ." See
also Zeitlin v. Arnebergh, 59 Cal. 2d 901, 922-23, 383 P.2d 152, 166, 31 Cal.
Rptr. 800, 814 (1963), where, in an obscenity case, he said: "The quicksilver
of creativity will not be solidified by legal pronouncement; it will sometime.T
flow into new and sometimes frightening fields. If, indeed, courts try to
forbid new and exotic expression, they will surely and fortunately fail." It
would seem that such libertarian views could easily encompass the possession
and use of marijuana as a means of "self-expression" or "creativity" within
the periphery of the first amendment.
185 See 250 A.C.A. 226, 235, 58 Cal. Rptr. 520, 527 (1967), where the wear-
ing of a beard is considered such a liberty; see text accompanying notes 91-96
supra.
186 See text accompanying notes 97-110 supra.
must show a "compelling interest" why it should limit the personal
rights according to People v. Woody.187  The appellate court under
the Woody decision may make an independent examination of the
record in ascertaining whether a compelling interest is shown.188
If it is thought that the statute is so broad as to be unnecessarily
restrictive of constitutional rights, both Griswold v. Connecticut and
Wollam v. City of Palm Springs are good authority that a narrower
statute is in order, i.e. one criminally sanctioning abuses of marijuana
and not its mere use and possession. 8 9
(3) Although the state has the burden of showing a "compelling
interest," the advocate would have to assemble the facts on mari-
juana and introduce them into the record in order to show a lack of
harm to the user and society. It is not necessary to show marijuana
is absolutely harmless. A showing of slight harm would be sufficient
as then the state's "compelling interest" requirement would not be
satisfied when balanced with the individual's fundamental rights. 90
Whether or not an argument such as that set forth in this
comment is feasible in light of practical circumstances is left up to
the advocate to decide. Considering the injustice the statute creates
through felony arrests and convictions and the abridgment of the
individual's freedom to experience and to express himself without
harm to others, the California marijuana possession statute ought to
be declared unconstitutional in its present form.
Addendum
The case of People v. Aguiar'9' was decided by the California
Court of Appeal as this-issue went to press. This case held that the
equal protection- clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution did not invalidate the California marijuana pos-
session statute. In answering appellant's argument that marijuana
should be classified in the same way as alcohol and other euphorics,
the court first examined the power of the state to legislate against
drugs in general. This due process analysis of the court depended
upon finding some rational relationship between the statute and the
state's promotion of the public health, safety, comfort, and welfare. 9 2
Although it was judicially noticed that respected medical opinion
considered that marijuana was neither habit-forming nor harmful,193
the court concluded that as long as there was "some" evidence upon
which the statute could be based then the court must uphold the
statute. 94 This conclusion was qualified with the provision that such
a rule so obtains unless the statute invidiously discriminates against
187 See text accompanying notes 113-39 supra.
188 See text accompanying notes 140-47 supra.
189 See text accompanying notes 131-39 supra.
190 See People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 727, 394 P.2d 813, 821, 40 Cal.
Rptr. 69, 77 (1964), where the- court said that since "[tihe use of peyote pre-
sents only slight danger to the state and to the enforcement of its laws ...
[t]he scale tips in favor of the constitutional protection." (emphasis added).
191 257 A.C.A. 691, 65 Cal. Rptr. 71 (1968).
192 Id. at 697, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 174.
'93 Id. at 697, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 174.
194 Id. at 697, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 175.
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any group (the equal protection argument) and unless it does not
intrude on specially protected areas enumerated in the Bill of
Rights.195
The discussion of constitutionally protected areas is relevant since
if possession of marijuana were within such an area, then more than
just "some" evidence upon which the legislature could act would be
necessary in order for the statute to be upheld. Indeed under the
analysis which has been advanced in this comment, the state would
have to show a compelling interest why it should infringe upon the
constitutional rights. 96 The court found that it was not up to it
to weigh fact-finding studies against each other since only some evi-
dence of marijuana's harm was sufficient to uphold the statute.197
This statement is not borne out by the California cases where the
state's compelling interest has been in issue. Where the state must
demonstrate a compelling interest to justify the statute then just such
a judicial resolution of the factual issues is required in order to deter-
mine the interest of the state. 198 This was clearly the situation in
People v. Woody' 9 9 discussed in this comment.
The court pointed out that there is no constitutionally protected
right to indulge in the use of euphoric drugs. For this proposition a
number of United States Supreme Court cases were cited which
upheld the state's power to legislate against the possession, use and
manufacture of alcoholic beverages.2 0 0  These cases dealt with the
right of a citizen to use alcohol within the privileges and immunities
clause and the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. In
light of the broad interpretation of personal liberties in the interven-
ing years since the decisions of the cases cited and in light of the
subsequent incorporation of much of the Bill of Rights into the four-
teenth amendment, it is submitted that these cases are very much in
doubt today. It can also be noted that since the alcohol possession
cases also deal with infringements on the privileges and immunities of
citizens rather than the constitutionally protected areas of the Bill
of Rights discussed in this comment, the cases can be distinguished.
The opinion also discussed Griswold v. Connecticut2 9 ' and In re
Klor.20 2 In noting that the principles of Griswold did not apply to
the possession of marijuana, the court restricted itself to the holding
of Griswold that only marital privacy was protected.20 3 In fact the
court expressly mentioned that appellant invoked no constitutional
principle analogous to marital privacy to protect the right to use
euphoric drugs.20 4 Thus the door was left open for such an argu-
ment as that advanced in this comment that a right of privacy exists
with respect to expression dealing solely with the mind.20 5
195 Id. at 697, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 175.
196 See text accompanying notes 119-30 supra.
197 257 A.C.A. at 697, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 175.
198 See text accompanying notes 140-47 supra.
199 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
200 257 A.C.A. at 698, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 175.
201 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
202 64 Cal. 2d 816, 415 P.2d 791, 51 Cal. Rptr. 903 (1966).
203 257 A.C.A. at 700, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 176.
204 Id.
205 See text accompanying notes 97-109 supra.
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The court's discussion of Klor was limited to deciding that the
case did not hold that the United States Constitution protects all pri-
vate conduct. 20 6 This is indeed true. As has been suggested in this
comment, only conduct essential to freedom of expression is to be
protected by the first amendment as construed by Klor.20 7 The simi-
larity between possession of obscene material for personal gratifica-
tion and possession of marijuana for personal use has already been
discussed in this comment and was not mentioned by the court in
its opinion.
Basically the decision of People v. Aguiar208 holds that the state
has a right to legislate against use and possession of marijuana as
long as there is some evidence available that it is harmful, provided
that no area of constitutional protection is invaded and provided that
the equal protection test is met. The purpose of this comment has
been to advance the proposition that areas of constitutional protec-
tion do exist with respect to possession and use of marijuana thus
requiring the state to come forward and show a compelling interest
why it can infringe upon these rights. This proposition is still un-
answered in California.
Michael A. Town*
206 257 A.C.A. at 700, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 176.
207 See text accompanying notes 89-90 supra.
208 257 A.C.A. 691, 65 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1968).
* Member, Third Year Class.
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